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Abstract. In the implementation of abstract synchronous communica-
tion in asynchronous unstructured low-level languages, e. g. using shared
variables, the preservation of safety and especially liveness properties is a
hitherto open problem due to inherently different abstraction levels. Our
approach to overcome this problem is threefold: First, we present our
notion of handshake refinement with which we formally prove the cor-
rectness of the implementation relation of a handshake protocol. Second,
we verify the soundness of our handshake refinement , i. e., all safety and
liveness properties are preserved to the lower level. Third, we apply our
handshake refinement to show the correctness of all implementations that
realize the abstract synchronous communication with the handshake pro-
tocol. To this end, we employ an exemplary language with asynchronous
shared variable communication. Our approach is scalable and closes the
verification gap between different abstraction levels of communication.
Keywords: unstructured code, liveness properties, handshake protocol,
formal verification, refinement
1 Introduction
In the rigorous model-driven design of low-level implementations, formal spec-
ifications are iteratively refined until an implementation model is reached. In
the subsequent transition to executable code, correctness is mostly subject to
informal reasoning due to the different abstraction levels. In this paper, we con-
sider unstructured low-level languages that are required to preserve safety and
liveness properties from the formal specification. The formal verification of the
relation between specification and implementation of communicating low-level
code can be split in two parts: 1) State transformations and control flow, and
2) communication. While we have presented an approach for 1) in [7,8], in this
paper we focus on the low-level implementation of communication. In particu-
lar, we do not consider the general question whether it is possible to implement
synchronous communication with asynchronous means, as this was shown in
e. g. [3]. In contrast, we propose a methodology to verify that a specification
2using abstract synchronous communication and a concrete implementation in a
low-level language using asynchronous shared variable communication have the
same safety and liveness properties based on a simple handshake protocol.
In synchronous communication, sender and receiver are determined at the
same time, whereas they are determined at different points in time in asyn-
chronous communication. Thus, asynchronous communication has more decision
points and a different branching behavior. The major problem is to prove preser-
vation of liveness properties for systems with different branching behavior. To
overcome this problem, we define the handshake refinement that enables the
construction and formal verification of implementation relations for the abstract
communication instruction. We show that this relation preserves safety and live-
ness properties. Finally, we use our notion of handshake refinement to show the
correctness of the implementation of abstract synchronous communication with
a handshake protocol in our generalized low-level language using shared variable
communication. Our theorem shows that all implementations with this protocol
are correct. This once-and-for-all approach is highly scalable and allows for com-
positional reasoning over shared variable communication. While the handshake
refinement is designed for this specific handshake protocol, its concepts can be
adapted to other protocols, which is left for future work.
2 Related work
In [4], Broy and Olderog investigate the relationship between synchronous and
asynchronous communication, where asynchronous communication is buffered,
e. g. via an additional buffer process. However we do not consider high-level
constructs such as buffers in our implementation language. Apart from the dif-
ferent abstraction level used by Broy and Olderog, their transformation from
synchronous to asynchronous systems is to introduce buffers for all (previously
synchronous) communication. In doing so, they lose synchronicity and the “re-
fusal structure” of the synchronous specification, i. e. the transformation does
not preserve liveness properties.
Peeters [9] models hardware, where low-level communication is synchronous
(a wire from sender to recipient). They still use synchronization primitives for
the implementation, and thus, does not apply to the problem we consider.
Basu et al. [1] define synchronizability of asynchronous systems. We show a
similar relation, namely that it is appropriate to consider a synchronized version
of the asynchronous system. The use of modeled queues is too abstract for our
problem, as we aim at verifying the abstract communication construct (e.g. queue
in this case) itself.
The CSP++ framework from Gardner [6] constructs a communication back-
bone from a CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) process, which can then
be enriched with C++ code. Although the idea of this framework is akin to correct
by construction design, the verification of this framework itself is not addressed.
In summary, all these approaches consider either a rather high level of ab-
straction, or do not consider formal verification of safety and liveness properties.
3Vertical Bisimulation by Rensink and Gorrieri [10] provides a congruence
relation for action refinements whose implementations can interleave. They do
not consider the refinement of the synchronization mechanism itself: Both source
language and target language use the same CSP-like synchronization. Their defi-
nition is different from the standard bisimulation in that it keeps track of started
executions of the implementations. This idea inspired our definition of the hand-
shake refinement .
Frutos Escrig et al [5] propose global bisimulations to achieve associativity
of nondeterministic choice. It has some similarity to our problem with split up
decisions (i. e. comparing two decisions at once to two consecutive decisions),
however our choices are deterministic. Moreover, it is specifically intended to be
a symmetric relation, and our problem is asymmetric, as we consider different
levels of abstraction. Therefore, the vertical bisimulation is a fitter candidate to
be adapted to our problem.
3 Background
In the following, we briefly introduce CSP and the low-level language CUC
(Communicating Unstructured Code) with synchronous communication which
we formerly presented. We base our notion of safety and liveness on CSP and
obtain compositionality for CUC by using CSP communication.
3.1 Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)
For our specification language CUC, we consider CSP-like abstract synchronous
communication (without broadcast) throughout this paper. The advantage is
that we can perform proofs compositionally, which is inherited from CSP. In
CSP [11], a refinement (Spec v Impl) describes a subset relation of the behavior.
The trace semantics (T ) records the traces and the trace refinement ensures the
preservation of safety properties. The stable failures semantics (SF) additionally
records the refused (and by negation the possible) events at each stable state,
thus allowing the stable failures refinement to ensure the preservation of liveness
properties. In CSP, the notion of refinement is compositional w.r.t. contexts (C),
i. e., when only a part of the system is refined, the whole system is also in a
refinement relation: AvB=⇒C(A)vC(B). As parallel composition can also be
part of the context C, this allows for modular verification of concurrent systems.
3.2 Communicating Unstructured Code (CUC)
We aim at verifying safety and liveness properties of the shared variable imple-
mentation of abstract synchronous communication. To focus on the difference
between abstract synchronous and low-level asynchronous communication, we
choose two languages which only differ in this aspect. As the implementation
language should be a low-level language with shared variable communication,
we choose a low-level language with abstract synchronous communication as
4a specification language. To this end, we employ the language CUC. It is a
generic low-level language with an abstract communication instruction, using
CSP’s multi-way synchronization. We introduced its operational and trace se-
mantics in [7] and its stable failures semantics together with a Hoare calculus
in [8]. The latter provides a framework to verify the stable failures refinement
relation between a CSP process and a CUC program, ensuring that the CUC
program preserves all safety and liveness properties of the CSP process.
We give a brief overview over CUC here, for details see [8]. The operational
semantics is depicted in Figure 1. The state σ is split into its program counter
σpc and its register store σrs, code is a fixed set of labeled instructions. CUC has
three instructions: 1) A nondeterministic multiple assignment (do), which can
be instantiated to actual low-level instruction, e. g. arithmetic operations. 2) A
conditional branch (cbr) and 3) the communication primitive. It communicates
an event nondeterministically chosen from the result of fev and then changes the
state according to freg. The comm instruction modifies the register store to record
input data. The implementation of comm fev freg is the subject of this paper.
The communication of CUC is the same as communication in CSP: All programs
offer events (in their alphabets αi), and if multiple offer the same events, they
non-deterministically choose one of them and make a synchronous step (sync).
Non-synchronized events and τ are performed interleavingly (interleaving).
(σpc, do f) ∈ code σ′rs ∈ f(σrs) σ′pc = σpc + 1
σ
τ−→code σ′
do
(σpc, cbr b m n) ∈ code σ′rs = σrs b σ ∧ σ′pc = m ∨ ¬b σ ∧ σ′pc = n
σ
τ−→code σ′
cbr
(σpc, comm fev freg) ∈ code ev ∈ fev(σrs) σ′rs = freg(σrs, ev) σ′pc = σpc + 1
σ
ev−→code σ′
comm
σ1
a−→c1 σ′1 σ2 a−→c2 σ′2 a ∈ α1 ∩ α2
σ1 ‖ σ2 a−→(
c1α1‖α2c2
) σ′1 ‖ σ′2 sync
interleaving-left
σ1
a−→c1 σ′1 a ∈ (α1 ∪ {τ}) \ α2
σ1 ‖ σ2 a−→(
c1α1‖α2c2
) σ′1 ‖ σ2
interleaving-right
σ2
a−→c2 σ′2 a ∈ (α2 ∪ {τ}) \ α1
σ1 ‖ σ2 a−→(
c1α1‖α2c2
) σ1 ‖ σ′2
Fig. 1: Operational Semantics for CUC
In the transition from synchronous to asynchronous communication, we perform
a refinement based on low-level communication protocols. In this paper, we fo-
cus on a handshake protocol over shared variables and restrict the use of CUC
constructs accordingly, i. e., to use only a sender and a receiver version of comm
and exclude communication with the environment. Additionally, we illustrate
our approach with a simple protocol here, and therefore prohibit the use of ex-
ternal choice within a component. To restrict the communication to directed
5communication, we consider two restricted variants of comm, as defined below.
Let c be a channel, xs and xr local registers, id the process id of the current
process and ID the set of all process ids. The event c.s.r.v is composed of the
channel c, the ids of the sender s and the receiver r, and the transferred data
value v. Finally, let val(c.s.r.v) = v extract the data value of an event.
: comms id c xs := comm
(
λσ. {c.id.r.σrs(xs) | r ∈ ID ∧ r 6= id}
)(
λaσ. σ
)
: commr id c xr := comm
(
λσ. {c.s.id.v | s ∈ ID ∧ s 6= id})(λaσ. σ(xr := val(a)))
comms offers events on its channel c, using its own id as sender, and all possible ids
as receiver. The data value is the value of its local storage at xs. After successful
communication, the sender does not change its local state. commr offers events
on its channel c, using its own id as a receiver, all possible ids as sender, and all
possible data values. After successful communication, the receiver updates its
local storage at xr to the value of the communicated event. By using events that
explicitly contain the id of the sender or the receiver respectively, we enforce that
senders cannot communicate among one another and the same for receivers.
In contrast to CSP and CUC, there is no environment in low-level shared
variable communication. Thus, a lone comm in CUC should not synchronize with
the environment but block. To enforce this in CUC, we only consider programs
with at least two components. Furthermore, the synchronization alphabet of each
concurrent program ci is given by αi = {c.s.r.v ∈ Σ | (s ∈ ids(Pi)∨r ∈ ids(Pi))}.
4 Shared Variable Semantics (SV)
In this section, we present the language Shared Variables (SV) and give its oper-
ational semantics. The intent of SV is to have a language with a pure interleaving
semantics (in contrast to CUC) and to implement synchronous communication
over shared variables with it. SV contains the instructions do f and cbr just like
CUC, but instead of the abstract communication instruction comm, it contains
the instructions needed for the low-level implementation of communication and
synchronization over shared variables: read, write and cas (Compare-and-Set).
The operational semantics for SV is depicted in Figure 2. For each compo-
nent, there is a program counter σpc and a local register store σrs as in CUC.
Furthermore, there is a global state Γ , which holds the values of locks, signals,
and shared variables. do and cbr (as described in rules do and cbr) have basi-
cally the same semantics as in CUC: They change the local state and the program
counter, but leave the global state Γ unchanged. cas (as described in rules cas-t
and cas-f) compares the value at a given address sv to a value v1 and, if they
are equal, writes the value v2 to that address. In either case, the comparison
result is written to the local register r. write and read (as described in rules
write and read) transfer values from local to global storage and vice versa.
Finally, the rules con-left and con-right define the interleaving semantics:
Whenever a component can take a step, the combination can take it, too. There
is no synchronous step. In the next section, we consider how to relate the comm
instruction and its implementation based on a simple handshake protocol.
6(σpc, do f) ∈ code σ′rs ∈ f(σrs) σ′pc = σpc + 1
(Γ, σ)
code−−−→ (Γ, σ′)
do
(σpc, cbr b m n) ∈ code σ′rs = σrs b σ ∧ σ′pc = m ∨ ¬b σ ∧ σ′pc = n
(Γ, σ)
code−−−→ (Γ, σ′)
cbr
(σpc, cas r sv v1 v2) ∈ code
Γ (sv) = v1 Γ
′ = Γ (sv := v2) σ
′
rs = σrs(r := >) σ′pc = σpc + 1
(Γ, σ)
code−−−→ (Γ ′, σ′)
cas-t
(σpc, cas r sv v1 v2) ∈ code Γ (sv) 6= v1 σ′rs = σrs(r := ⊥) σ′pc = σpc + 1
(Γ, σ)
code−−−→ (Γ, σ′)
cas-f
(σpc, write sv x) ∈ code Γ ′ = Γ (sv := σrs(x)) σ′rs = σrs σ′pc = σpc + 1
(Γ, σ)
code−−−→ (Γ ′, σ′)
write
(σpc, read x sv) ∈ code σ′rs = σrs(x := Γ (sv)) σ′pc = σpc + 1
(Γ, σ)
code−−−→ (Γ, σ′)
read
(Γ, σ1)
c1−→ (Γ ′, σ′1)
(Γ, σ1 ‖ σ2) c1‖c2−−−→ (Γ ′, σ′1 ‖ σ2)
con-left
(Γ, σ2)
c2−→ (Γ ′, σ′2)
(Γ, σ1 ‖ σ2) c1‖c2−−−→ (Γ ′, σ1 ‖ σ′2)
con-right
Fig. 2: Operational Semantics for SV
4.1 Handshake Protocol in SV
In SV, many protocols realizing synchronous communication can be implemented.
In this paper, we focus on a handshake protocol over shared variables.
send: 1 : cas hlc mc free id
2 : cbr hlc 3 1
3 : write svc xs
4 : write src >
5 : cas ssc frc > ⊥
6 : cbr ssc 7 5
7 : write mc free
receive: 1 : cas ssc src > ⊥
2 : cbr ssc 3 1
3 : read xr svc
4 : write frc >
Fig. 3: Send and receive: implementations of the comms and commr instructions
comms and commr are implemented in SV by the constructs shown in Figure 3
with a simple handshake protocol. The general idea is that send locks the channel
to protect the shared variable, and synchronizes over signals with receive. The
protocol flow is illustrated in Figure 5. The shared variables representing the
mutex and the signals are assumed to be exclusive for each channel.1 We explain
the details of the implementations of the sender and the receiver line by line:
1 That mutexes and signals are only accessed from the corresponding send and receive
blocks can be checked syntactically.
7send (1) checks if the mutex mc belonging to the channel is free, and if it is,
writes its id to it. (2) If it is not free, it checks again (busy loop). Otherwise it
proceeds to (3) write the data value to be sent (from the local register xs) to
the shared variable sv c. Afterwards, it realizes a synchronization with the read
process: It (4) sets the signal src. Then it (5, 6) waits with a busy loop for the
signal frc and finally (7) releases the mutex.
receive (1,2) waits with a busy loop for the signal src. If it received the signal,
it (3) reads the value from the shared variable and then (4) sets the signal frc.
Observe that deadlocks from CUC that are due to missing communication
partners are implemented as spinlocks in SV: send cannot exit the busy loop
(line 5, 6) without a receiver on the same channel, and receive cannot exit the
loop (lines 1, 2) without a sender in the channel.
4.2 Definitions to Relate comm and its Implementations
To formally capture that a CUC and an SV program are syntactically the same
apart from the implementation of the abstract communication, we define the
program label map. As the implementation of the abstract communication is
inserted, the following labels shift accordingly. We use this definition to define
the notion of an SV program fitting a CUC program.
Definition 1 (Program label map). A program label map ψ maps injectively
a program label in a CUC program cuc to a corresponding program label in an
SV program sv. For the formal requirements to ψ see Figure 4.
(`, do f) ∈ cucid ⇐⇒(ψ(`), do f) ∈ sv id ∧ ψ(`+ 1) = ψ(`) + 1
(`, cbr b m n) ∈ cucid ⇐⇒(ψ(`), cbr b ψ(m) ψ(n)) ∈ sv id
(`, comms id c xs) ∈ cucid ⇐⇒
(
ψ(`) + 0, cas mc free id) ∈ sv id...
...
...
′′ ⇐⇒(ψ(`) + 6, write mc free) ∈ sv id
′′ =⇒ ψ(`+ 1) = ψ(`) + 7
(`, commr id c xr) ∈ cucid ⇐⇒
(
ψ(`) + 0, cas src > ⊥) ∈ sv id...
...
...
′′ ⇐⇒(ψ(`) + 3, write frc >) ∈ sv id
′′ =⇒ ψ(`+ 1) = ψ(`) + 4
Fig. 4: Requirements to a program label map ψ
Definition 2 (Fitting program). We say that an SV program sv fits a CUC
program cuc, if there is a program label map ψ, mapping all the instructions from
cuc to sv. Furthermore, we require the state transforming functions f of do f
to only modify the variables available in cuc (i. e. not hlc and ssc). Similarly,
the boolean conditions b of cbr instructions in cuc may only depend on variables
present in cuc.
8Channel constituents group all variables that belong to a channel.
Definition 3 (Channel constituents). The following local registers belong
to a channel c: hlc and ssc. The following shared variables belong to a channel
c: mc, sv c src, and frc.
In the following, we assume that channel constituents are unique for each chan-
nel. The registers belonging to a channel are exactly the registers that are present
in sv but not in cuc. Thus, when comparing a local state of cuc and sv , we ig-
nore those registers. We can now define similarity of local state, which we use
to relate CUC states and SV states.
Definition 4 (Similarity w.r.t channel constituents). Let σ =̂ σˆ denote
that σ and σˆ are equal for all registers that do not belong to a channel. This
equality also does not include the program counter. We say σ is similar to σˆ.
Note that =̂ does include the register into which receive writes the value read
from the shared variable, thus receiving a value is visible to the =̂ relation.
Having defined CUC, SV and the protocol we want to verify, in the next
section we define our notion of handshake refinement to formally relate CUC
and SV programs, ensuring that safety and liveness properties are preserved.
5 Handshake Refinement
The idea of the handshake refinement is to extend usual behavioral relations of
two states or processes (as in bisimulations or refinements) with a third element
(the lockstate) to track the progress of the protocol execution. This enables dif-
ferent treatment in the relation of the same CUC state at different stages of the
protocol execution. We use it to indicate which possible events of the CUC state
need to be answered by the SV state. The lockstate L is a function from channel
names to {free} unionmulti ID in unionmulti (ID × ID)in unionmulti (ID × ID)un unionmulti IDun . Every channel
has one of five states: It can be free, a sender or both a sender and a receiver
are in the channel, and after the communication happened, the channel will be
eventually unlocked, first with both a sender and a receiver still in the channel,
then only a sender. The states of the lockstate within the protocol flow are illus-
trated in Figure 5 in the rectangular boxes. For each channel, the SV states and
possible transitions of send (S, S1 to S6; on the left) and receive (R, R1 to R3;
on the right) are depicted, and in the upper right corner also those of do (D) and
cbr (C), as well as those pointing outside the code (O). N is a placeholder for
O, D, C, S, or R. Dotted lines indicate the transition to the next lockstate. The
dashed line marks the moment where the communication happens, i. e. all states
above are in a relation to the CUC state before the communication, and those
below to the CUC state after the communication has happened. The arrows over
(S1), (S5’), and (R2) denote whether cbr will jump back to the first label or
forward to the second label, based on the cas instruction before. Note that the
transitions of send from S4 to S4’ and S5 to S5’ happen without a step from
the sending component, but correspond to the transition of receive on the same
9channel from R2 to R3. We define the following shorthands for the lockstate:
id /∈ L := ∀ c. L(c) 6= idin/un∧
( ∀ id′. L(c) 6= (id, id′)in/un)∧L(c) 6= (id′, id)in/un)
and L = ∅ := ∀ c. L(c) = free.
S←−S1
cas mc = ⊥
cbr
−→
S1
cas mc = >
S2
cbr
S3
write sv c
S4
write src
←−
S5
cas frc = ⊥
cbr
R
←−
R1
cas src = ⊥
cbr
−→
R1
cas src = >
R2
cbr
R3
read sv c
N
write frc
S4’
←−
S5’
cbr
−→
S5’
cas frc = >
S6
cbr
N
write mc free
L(c) 6= free
L(c) = free
L(c) = sin
L(c) = (s, r)in
L(c) = (s, r)un
b
ef
or
e
co
m
m
u
n
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n
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r
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m
m
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n
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L(c) = sun
L(c) = free
O D
N
do
N
do
N
do
C
N
cbr
Fig. 5: The flow of the handshake protocol
To define the stable failures on SV independently of the handshake refinement,
we cannot use the lockstate. In contrast to the vertical bisimulation [10], the
visible event in the protocol implementation is never at the beginning of the
implementation (and cannot be, as neither sender nor receiver are determined
at the beginning). To overcome this problem, we introduce a special event for the
invisible steps of the implementation. As the “usual” invisible event τ is already
included (do, cbr), we denote the invisible instructions of the implementation of
communication with τc. This way, we can define stable states before the execution
of the protocol implementation, but let the refusal sets refer to events during
10
the execution of the protocol implementation. This enables us to bridge the
gap between abstract synchronous semantics, where the event coincides with
both decision points, and the low-level asynchronous semantics, where the event
happens after the second decision. To define stable failures semantics for SV, we
define a labeling function mapping transitions in sv to events. Transitions are
identified by the starting state and the executed instruction. Visible events are
only mapped to read, τc to the invisible instructions of the implementation of
the communication. All other instructions (do and cbr) are invisible with the
usual τ .
Definition 5 (Event labeling for sv). Let EL be a function from state, id of
the component executing the next instruction, and its next instruction to events
of cuc, τ , or τc.
EL
(
(Γ, ), id, read svc
) 7→ c.s.r.v where s = Γ (mutex c), r = id, v = Γ (svc)
EL( , , ins) 7→ τc if ins is part of send or receive (see Fig. 3)
EL( , , ) 7→ τ otherwise
Using the labeling function EL, we can derive SV semantics with visible events:
Definition 6 (SV semantics with events).
: (Γ, σ)
ev−→sv (Γ ′, σ′) :⇔ (Γ, σ) sv−→ (Γ ′, σ′) ∧
( ∃ id ins. ev = EL((Γ, σ), id, ins))
Here, the active component id is determined by the component whose program
counter changed, and ins is the instruction the program counter of the active
component points to. To ensure that every executed instruction changes the
program counter, we require that no cbr instruction jumps to its own label.
∀ (σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ. a can be visible or τ
Similar local states: σ =̂ σˆ
Protocol constraints: Pcuc,sv,ψ
(
σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)
)
(see Figure 7)
Down-simulation:
∀ a σ′. a 6= τ ∧ L(chan(a)) = free ∧ σ a−→cuc σ′ =⇒
∃Γ ′ σˆ′ ids idr L′. (Γ, σˆ) τc−→∗sv a−→sv (Γ ′, σˆ′) ∧ L′(chan(a)) = (ids, idr)un ∧(
σ′, L′, (Γ ′, σˆ′)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ
∀σ′. σ τ−→cuc σ′ =⇒
∃Γ ′ σˆ′ L′. (Γ, σˆ) τc−→∗sv τ−→sv (Γ ′, σˆ′) ∧
(
σ′, L′, (Γ ′, σˆ′)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ
Up-simulation:
∀(Γ ′, σˆ′). (Γ, σˆ) τc−→sv (Γ ′, σˆ′) =⇒ ∃L′.
(
σ, L′, (Γ ′, σˆ′)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ
∀ a (Γ ′, σˆ′). (Γ, σˆ) a−→sv (Γ ′, σˆ′) =⇒ ∃σ′ L′. σ a−→cuc σ′ ∧
(
σ′, L′, (Γ ′, σˆ′)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ
Unlocking-simulation:
∃ c ids. L(c) = (ids)un ∨
(∃ idr. L(c) = (ids, idr)un) =⇒
∃Γ ′ σˆ′ L′. (Γ, σˆ) τc−→∗sv (Γ ′, σˆ′) ∧ L′ = L(c := free) ∧
(
σ, L′, (Γ ′, σˆ′)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ
Fig. 6: Handshake Refinement
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Pcuc,sv,ψ
(
σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)
)
:=
(
L(c)=free=⇒¬Γ (src)∧¬Γ (frc)
)∧∀ id.Pidcuc,sv,ψ(σ, L, (Γ, σˆ))
Pidcuc,sv,ψ
(
σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)
)
:= O∨D∨C∨S∨S1∨S2∨S3∨S4∨S5∨S4′∨S5′∨S6∨R∨R1∨R2∨R3
O, D, C Have a direct counterpart in CUC, channel variables are not a concern, id /∈ L
D do f instruction
C cbr
S At the beginning of send , id /∈ L
S1 Branch according to result of cas in S. If the component now has the mutex, than
also the signals must be inactive.
S2 From now on in this execution of the protocol, the id of the component is in the
mutex and in the lockstate.
S3 The data value to be communicated is in the shared variable.
S4 Start reading was set to > from S3 to S4. If the receiver did start, then start
reading will remain ⊥ from now on. In the first case the lockstate only contains the
sender, in the second also the receiver. The first row of the formula ensures, that
the SV state is mapped to a CUC state where the pc points to the appropriate comm.
(σidpc, comms id c xs) ∈ cucid ∧ (σˆidpc, cas ssc frc>⊥) ∈ sv id ∧ ψ(σidpc) + 4 = σˆidpc
∧ Γ (mc) = id ∧ Γ (svc) = σˆidrs(xs) ∧ ¬Γ (frc)
∧ (Γ (src) ∧ L(c) = idin ∨ ¬Γ (src) ∧ (∃ idr. L(c) = (id, idr)in))
S5 Branch back to S4, as the communication has not happened yet.
S4’ From now on, the communication already has happened. The lockstate is now set
to unlocking. Observe, that now the SV state is in a relation with the CUC state
that occurs after the communication. Therefore we need to substract 1 from the
pc of the SV state, to map with ψ to comm.
(σidpc −1, comms id c xs) ∈cucid ∧ (σˆidpc, cas ssc frc>⊥) ∈ sv id ∧ ψ(σidpc −1) + 4 = σˆidpc
∧ Γ (mc) = id ∧ ¬Γ (src)
∧ (Γ (frc) ∧ L(c) = idun ∨ ¬Γ (frc) ∧ (∃ idr.L(c) = (id, idr)un))
S5’ Branch according to the result of cas in S4’.
S6 The signals are ⊥, in the next step the mutex and the lockstate will be free.
R At the beginning of receive, id /∈ L
R1 Branch according to result of cas in R. If the component is now a receiver, both
sender and receiver ids are in the lockstate of the channel. The state of the signals
is already fixed in the disjunct of the sender where both are in the lockstate.
R2 The lockstate contains the sender and the receiver about to communicate.
R3 The lockstate still contains the sender and the receiver, but now about to unlock
the channel. The SV state is now in a relation with the CUC state after the
communication.
Fig. 7: Protocol restrictions
We define the handshake refinement in Figure 6. It is a relation parametrized
over two programs cuc and sv fitting with ψ. The elements are triplets consisting
of a parallel CUC state σ, a lockstate L, and pair of global state Γ and parallel
local SV states σˆ. Our handshake refinement consists of two properties describ-
ing the states, and three describing the possible transitions. In each triplet, the
CUC states and the local SV states are similar. Furthermore, they fulfill the
protocol constraints Pcuc,sv ,ψ, which constrain the possible SV states and their
relation to CUC states. Pcuc,sv ,ψ is defined in Figure 7 and explained below. The
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possible transitions are described by the down-, up-, and unlocking-simulation.
The down-simulation relates transitions in CUC to one or more transitions
in SV. Observe that visible events only need to be answered, if the channel is
free. This precludes triplets where the sender in SV is already decided but the
CUC state still could choose a different sender. It is sound to ignore those SV
states in the down-simulation, as we are only interested if the implementation
(as a whole) allows and offers the same events. Although there is no “equiva-
lent” state in CUC, all other senders were possible right before this choice of a
particular sender, so we do not ignore different possible events, only the inter-
mediate states. The up-simulation relates transitions in SV to transitions in
CUC. τc events are related to zero transitions in CUC, all other events to one.
Finally, the unlocking-simulation ensures (under simple fairness) that, after
the communication has happened, the channel will be freed eventually. This al-
lows the down-simulation to only consider states, where the channel is free. In
the remainder of this paper, let Bcuc,sv,ψ denote a handshake refinement .
Figure 7 describes the protocol constraints Pcuc,sv ,ψ, which are specific to
the handshake protocol at hand. They also ensure that only SV states reachable
by protocol execution are included and that the lockstate reflects the current
progress of the protocol execution. The overall definition is that for every chan-
nel, if the lockstate is free, the belonging signals must be ⊥, and for each
component, the disjunction Pidcuc,sv ,ψ must hold. The disjuncts describe triplets
(cuc, L, sv), providing sufficient conditions to the SV state (program counter and
channel related variables) and relating them to a CUC state (program counter)
via ψ with the appropriate lockstate. In Pidcuc,sv ,ψ, the lockstate also “synchro-
nizes” the different components, i. e., excludes illegal state combinations. It fol-
lows a description of the disjuncts, from which we provide two formally. 2
6 Preservation of Safety and Liveness Properties
In this section, we prove that our handshake refinement preserves safety and
liveness properties of the considered CUC program cuc to a fitting SV program
sv . This implies that sv only has behavior allowed by cuc (safety), and also
preserves the progress (liveness). To this end, we define traces and stable failures
semantics for both CUC and SV via an operational characterization and then
show the stable failures refinement between cuc and sv . First, we define traces
both for CUC and SV.
Definition 7 (Trace semantics). We write P
tr
=⇒cuc/sv Q to describe that
there is an execution path from P to Q in cuc/sv, and during that execution the
visible events in tr occur exactly in that order. We call tr the trace from P to Q
over cuc/sv. Let T (P )cuc/sv be all traces starting in P over cuc/sv.
Not all possible SV states are legal in a handshake refinement , i. e., not all states
are reachable by execution of the handshake protocol. We consider SV states
2 For a complete formal version we refer to our Technical Report [2].
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(Γ0, σˆ0) as initial states, if all components of σˆ0 only point to the first instruction
of send or receive (or the second, which is cbr, if it jumps back) and all mutexes
are free and the signals are inactive (⊥). An empty lockstate in the handshake
refinement
(
σ0, ∅, (Γ0, σˆ0)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ implies those properties. Using induction
on the up-simulation, we can show that every trace in T (Γ0, σˆ0)sv leads to a
triplet in Bcuc,sv,ψ and the same trace is in T (σ0)cuc leading to the same triplet:
Lemma 1 (All sv traces and their cuc counterparts are in Bcuc,sv,ψ).(
σ0, ∅, (Γ0, σˆ0)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ ∧ (Γ0, σˆ0) tr=⇒sv (Γ, σˆ)
=⇒ ∃σ L′. (σ, L′, (Γ, σˆ)) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ ∧ σ0 tr=⇒cuc σ
We can directly conclude the preservation of safety properties:
Theorem 1 (Preservation of safety properties).(
σ0, ∅, (Γ0, σˆ0)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ =⇒ T (Γ0, σˆ0)sv ⊆ T (σ0)cuc
Having shown that our handshake refinement preserves safety properties, we
proceed to show that it also preserves liveness properties. We capture liveness
properties using the notion of stable failures (inspired by CSP). To this end, we
define the notions of stable states and refusal sets to finally define the stable
failures, both for CUC and SV. We then show that the stable failures of sv are
included in the stable failures of cuc. Thus, all liveness properties from cuc are
preserved in sv . A state is stable if no internal transition is possible.
Definition 8 (Stable states in cuc). A state σ is stable in cuc (σ↓cuc) if all
components either point outside the code, to comms, or to commr. Formally:
: σ↓cuc:= ∀ id.
( 6 ∃ ins. (σ(id)pc, ins) ∈ cuc(id)) ∨
:
( ∃ c. (σ(id)pc, comms id c xs) ∈ cuc(id) ∨ (σ(id)pc, commr id c xr) ∈ cuc(id))
Refusal sets and stable failures are defined similarly to their CSP counterparts.
Definition 9 (Refusal set in cuc). A state σ refuses a set of visible events
X in cuc, if it cannot perform any a ∈ X. Let X ⊆ Σ.
: σ refcuc X := ∀ a ∈ X. ¬
(
σ
a−→cuc
)
Definition 10 (Stable failures of cuc). A stable failure is a pair of a trace
tr and a refusal set X. It denotes that there is a stable state σ which can be
reached from the initial state init via the trace tr and refuses X.
: (tr,X) ∈ SFcuc(init) := ∃σ. init tr=⇒cuc σ ∧ σ↓cuc ∧ σ refcuc X
Next, we define stable states, refusal sets, and stable failures for sv . The stable
states and failures are similar to the definitions for cuc. The refusal sets differ, as
they need to account for the invisible execution steps of the handshake protocol.
Definition 11 (Stable states in sv). A state (Γ, σˆ) is stable in sv ((Γ, σˆ)↓sv)
if all components either point outside the code or to the first instruction of send
or receive. Formally:
: (Γ, σˆ)↓sv:= ∀ id.
( 6 ∃ ins. (σˆ(id)pc, ins) ∈ sv(id)) ∨
:
( ∃ c. (σˆ(id)pc, cas mc free id) ∈ sv(id) ∨ (σˆ(id)pc, cas src > ⊥) ∈ sv(id))
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The stable states in sv coincide with the stable states in cuc (pointing to comms,
commr or outside of the code). They can neither make a visible event step nor
a τ step, but might be able to make a τc step. As the visible event (i. e. read)
occurs only in the middle of the execution of the handshake protocol, a finite
number of τc-steps is allowed before the visible event to consider it “enabled”.
Assuming fairness, i. e., at any point for any component, there is a finite number
of steps after which the component will make a step, possible communication
happens after a finite number of τc-steps. Conversely, if communication is not
possible, i. e., a deadlock occurs in the synchronous setting, the implementation
of the handshake protocol will stay in a busy loop, thus the visible event is not
reachable.
Definition 12 (Refusal set in sv). A state refuses a set of visible events in
sv, if they are not reachable after a finite number of τc steps. Let X ⊆ Σ.
: P refsv X := ∀ a ∈ X. ¬
(
P
τc−→∗sv a−→sv
)
Definition 13 (Stable failures of SV). A stable failure is a pair of a trace
tr and a refusal set X. It denotes that there is a stable state (Γ, σˆ) which can be
reached from the initial state init via the trace tr and refuses X.
: (tr,X) ∈ SFsv(init) := ∃(Γ, σˆ). init tr=⇒sv (Γ, σˆ) ∧ (Γ, σˆ)↓sv ∧ (Γ, σˆ) refsv X
To show the preservation of liveness properties, we first show two lemmas: That
stable states in sv imply stable states in cuc, and the key lemma, that refusals
of sv imply refusals of cuc.
Lemma 2 (Stable states in sv imply stable states in cuc and L = ∅).
:
(
σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ ∧ (Γ, σˆ)↓sv =⇒ σ↓cuc ∧ L = ∅
Proof. As Bcuc,sv,ψ is a handshake refinement , Pcuc,sv ,ψ
(
σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)
)
holds. In
Pcuc,sv ,ψ the cases where (Γ, σˆ)↓sv holds imply σ↓cuc and L = ∅.
Lemma 3 (Refusals in sv imply refusals in cuc).
:
(
σ, L, (Γ, σˆ)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ ∧ (Γ, σˆ)↓sv =⇒ (Γ, σˆ) refsv X =⇒ σ refcuc X
Proof. Using Lemma 2, we can apply the down-simulation.3
Theorem 2 (Preservation of liveness properties).
:
(
σ0, ∅, (Γ0, σˆ0)
) ∈ Bcuc,sv,ψ =⇒ SFsv(Γ0, σˆ0) ⊆ SFcuc(σ0)
Proof. Using the Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.3
Corollary 1 (Liveness properties without sender ID). An adaption of the
handshake protocol given in Figure 3, where in the mutex only taken is stored
instead of the sender id, also preserves all safety and liveness properties.
Proof. As the behavior of the protocol does not depend on the sender id being
stored in the mutex, only whether the mutex is free or not, the behavior of
the original and adapted protocols is the same, thus also the same properties
are preserved. Note that the information about the sender is only needed for the
proofs to reconstruct who the sender was, when the receiver reads the value. uunionsq
3 A more detailed proof can be found in our Technical Report [2].
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7 Handshake Refinement for Fitting Programs
In this section, we show that any cuc program and fitting sv program are in
a handshake refinement relation. More specifically, we show that all sensible
initial states are in a handshake refinement relation. This general theorem allows
for a scalable approach to the verification of shared variable communication.
The proof sketch can be found in [2] and is similar to bisimilarity proofs: all
possible transitions of one part can be answered by its counterpart. An important
difference is that the down-simulation needs to be shown (“has to answer”) only
in stable states, due to it being a refinement and not a bisimulation.
Theorem 3 (Fitting implies handshake refinement). Let sv be a program
fitting cuc with ψ. Then there is a handshake refinement Bcuc,sv,ψ containing
all initial pairs, i. e., similar CUC and SV states where the program counters of
each component match with ψ, all mutexes in Γ are free, all signals inactive.
As the handshake refinement implies preservation of safety (Theorem 1) and
liveness (Theorem 2) properties, we can now conclude with Theorem 3, that all
fitting programs preserve safety and liveness properties:
Theorem 4 (Fitting implies preservation). Let sv be a program fitting cuc
with ψ. Then all safety and liveness properties from cuc are preserved to sv.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a method to relate abstract synchronous com-
munication with an asynchronous handshake implementation using shared vari-
able communication and have proved that this relation preserves safety and
liveness properties. To this end, we have introduced our novel notion of hand-
shake refinement , which is similar to strong bisimulation, apart from the protocol
implementation, which is a refinement. It explicitly captures the state of progres-
sion through the executions of the implementations of the protocol. Moreover,
we have proved in the general Theorem 4, that all pairs of CUC and SV pro-
grams, where the SV program results from the CUC program by replacing the
abstract communication instructions with their handshake implementation, have
the same safety and liveness properties. Together with a compositional method
to show safety and liveness properties for CUC programs [8], we have a composi-
tional framework to prove the preservation of safety and liveness properties from
abstract specifications in CSP to down to low-level code, including asynchronous
communication mechanisms.
Although we have presented our method for a concrete (handshake) proto-
col, it provides the foundation for a more generalized notion of relations be-
tween abstract synchronous and concrete asynchronous communication based
on other communication/synchronization protocols. The presented protocol can
be divided into four phases (which match with the four non-FREE lockstates):
1) registration, 2) before communication, 3) after communication, 4) unregis-
tration. This is also the structure the handshake refinement relies upon. As the
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presented handshake protocol is intentionally simple, the phases are very short.
Our approach can be extended to other protocols that fit in those four phases,
e. g. to verify a protocol which supports a “selection on channels” (external choice
in CSP). This “selection”, i. e. finding a channel with a present communication
partner, would happen in phase 1. This way, not only input guards, but also
output guards could be supported. Overall, we have shown the preservation of
liveness properties using the stable failures model. This does not consider live-
locks (divergences). However, as the related CUC and SV programs are the same
outside of the protocol implementation and jumps do not occur into our out of
the protocol implementation, no livelocks are introduced. Inside the protocol im-
plementation, livelocks in SV are only introduced when unsuccessfully waiting
for a communication partner, in which case the CUC program was deadlocked,
so no progress is eliminated.
In future work, we plan to investigate relations similar to the handshake re-
finement for different communication protocols. We are currently working on
formalizing the entire presented approach in the interactive theorem prover Is-
abelle/HOL to guarantee the correctness of proofs and to enable the reusability
of the formalization, e. g. for other protocols.
References
1. Basu, S., Bultan, T., Ouederni, M.: Synchronizability for verification of asyn-
chronously communicating systems. In: VMCAI’12 Proceedings. LNCS, vol. 7148,
pp. 56–71. Springer (2012)
2. Berg, N., Go¨thel, T., Glesner, S., Danziger, A.: Technical Report accompany-
ing: Preserving Liveness Guarantees from Synchronous Communication to Asyn-
chronous Unstructured Low-Level Languages. DepositOnce (2018).
http://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-7192
3. Brookes, S.D.: On the relationship of CCS and CSP. In: Automata, Languages and
Programming, Proceedings. LNCS, vol. 154, pp. 83–96. Springer (1983)
4. Broy, M., Olderog, R.: Trace-Oriented Models of Concurrency. In: Handbook of
Process Algebra, Chapter 2. Elsevier (2001)
5. de Frutos-Escrig, D., Gregorio-Rodr´ıguez, C.: Process Equivalences as Global
Bisimulations. In: J. UCS, vol. 12(11), pp. 1521–1550. (2006)
6. Gardner, W.B.: Bridging CSP and C++ with selective formalism and executable
specifications. In: MEMOCODE’03 Proceedings. p. 237. IEEE (2003),
7. Ja¨hnig, N., Go¨thel, T., Glesner, S.: A denotational semantics for communicating
unstructured code. In: FESCA’15 Proceedings. EPTCS, vol. 178, pp. 9–21 (2015)
8. Ja¨hnig, N., Go¨thel, T., Glesner, S.: Refinement-based verification of communicating
unstructured code. In: SEFM’16 Proceedings. pp. 61–75 (2016),
9. Peeters, A.M.G.: Implementation of handshake components. In: Communicating
Sequential Processes: The First 25 Years, Symposium on the Occasion of 25 Years
of CSP, LNCS, vol. 3525, pp. 98–132. Springer (2004),
10. Rensink, A., Gorrieri, R.: Action refinement as an implementation relations. In:
TAPSOFT’97 Proceedings. LNCS, vol. 1214, pp. 772–786. Springer (1997)
11. Roscoe, A.W.: Understanding Concurrent Systems. Texts in Computer Science,
Springer (2010)
